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Abstract 
The debate on gay marriage has gathered pace globally and particularly in 
France. Here, the secularization of marriage as an ‘acte laïque’ has furthered 
progress towards a political and juridic recognition of gay marriage. The 
Catholic church (Vatican) has opposed this development in its re-enforcement 
of Catholic sexual ethics and the distinction it draws between secular and 
religious definitions of marriage. Complicating this distinction is the per-
ception of a trend towards post-secularism in France where religion is 
making a return to democratic debates on citizenship and gender, and 
raising concerns over the status of the civility of the marriage act. The 
focus of this article is to look at gay marriage from the perspective of con-
temporary ethical and theological thinking. Specifically, I aim to examine 
alternative discourses that open up new ways of configuring gay marriage 
through an examination of concepts of integrity, responsibility and asceti-
cism, and critically the ethical relationship between autonomy and norms. 
Keywords: gay marriage, ethics, Catholicism, secularism 
The question I want to address in this article is whether there is a valid 
theological ethic to gay marriage in France. Gay marriage, both in France 
and indeed globally, has become a focal point for many lesbian and gay 
people, sympathizers and political movements. In contemporary France, 
one could argue that gay marriage has now become the endgame in a 
longer historical struggle which began with the decriminalization of 
homosexuality in 1982 and concluded with the implementation of the 
PaCS (Pacte civil de solidarité) in 1999. Socially and culturally, gay 
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marriage has been gaining in acceptance in Western Europe.1 Politically 
and legally, there is an ongoing and increasingly stronger case for the 
legalization of gay marriage on the grounds of equality and anti-discrim-
ination legislation. Similarly, recent challenges to French laïcité from a 
resurgence in religious belief are part of a wider challenge to French 
democratic republicanism in which new autonomies of individualism 
and particularism are being seen to make public ‘usage’ out of new 
legalized private interest. It is therefore in this context of the perceived 
‘triumph’ of private interest over public interest that gay marriage is 
making significant inroads into French socio-cultural and political life. 
It is my contention, however, that the debate on gay marriage has 
reached a plateau. If the goal of lesbian and gay activism in France is the 
holy grail of marriage, then this is surely not a distant reality, at least in 
the context of marriage as an ‘acte laïque’, dependent on civil law. But 
from a religious or theological perspective, the situation is very different. 
For the Vatican, gay marriage is a non-starter; Catholicism and other 
religions reject homosexuality, let alone gay marriage, on very specific 
grounds. However, does this Magisterial rejectionism represent the final 
nail in the coffin for a theological dimension to gay marriage? Assuming 
that marriage is still a desirable goal for lesbians and gays,2 this article 
addresses recent theological debates on ethics as a way of opening up 
new ways of approaching gay marriage. In the first part of this article, I 
look at the new climate of French laïcité, and examine how trends towards 
post-secularism may help articulate new lines of understanding gay 
sexuality and marriage. In the second and third parts, I contextualize the 
issue of gay marriage within a wider analysis of Catholic sexual ethics of 
marriage, and the politics of gay marriage in France. In the final section, I 
argue that current debates on ethics in France offer new insights into a 
discourse on gay marriage within theological paradigms of autonomy, 
integrity, authenticity, will and responsibility. This discourse will also be 
seen to mirror in its sensitivities and nuances some aspects of Christian 
sexual ethics, without the latter’s preconditions on certain universals and 
a priori norms. 
1. In two polls conducted by Elle (10 May 2004) and Têtu (17 May 2004), 64 per 
cent and 57 per cent respectively of respondents were in favour of gay marriage. 
2. Denis Quinqueton and Jan-Paul Pouliquen, who drew up the legislation for 
the PaCS legislation, have claimed consistently that marriage does not represent 
progress for lesbian and gay couples. They see progess in improving the PaCS legis-
lation. In this respect, see the article by Stéphanie Noblet, ‘L’intensité du débat 
satisfait les associations de défense des gays’, Le Monde, 4 juin 2004, p. 16. 
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Post-secular France 
In 1985, the sociologist Marcel Gauchet announced the end of religion 
and the emergence of democracy as the new socio-historical space in 
which humankind could redirect any lingering thoughts of alterity or 
transcendence.3 Gauchet has since revised his thinking in the light of 
socio-cultural transformations and his realization that private interest in 
France has now replaced the general interest.4 In effect, as Agnès Antoine 
confirms in her assessment of Gauchet’s revisionism, politics as a sub-
stitute for religion has been replaced by a loss in gravitas for the function 
of the public.5 The effect of this for socio-cultural politics in France has 
been twofold. First, in the decline of democracy and the function of 
politics, there has been a new return to religious belief (the very premise 
that Gauchet had rejected back in 1985). According to Antoine, the 
danger for laïcité of this return of religion is that individuals increasingly 
want their specific religious allegiance recognized (legally, politically 
and culturally) at the expense of the universal and general interest. This 
is not to say that the particular rides roughshod over the public interest. 
It is more the case, as Danièle Hervieu-Léger has suggested, that the 
trend towards individualism and autonomous decision-making is on the 
rise, and while the awareness of the sense of a general interest is ever-
present, there is equally no sense of an obligation to embrace it.6  
The consequences of politics and democracy losing their power to 
produce a common mission of collective agency (Gauchet’s concept of 
‘being-together’7) are considerable on multiple fronts, none more so than 
ethically; the usurpation of heteronomous universalism by a prolifera-
tion of autonomous individualisms has both negative and positive asso-
3. Marcel Gauchet, Le Désenchantement du monde (Paris: Gallimard, 1985). 
4. Gauchet, La Religion dans la démocratie: Parcours de la laïcité (Paris: Gallimard, 
1998). 
5. Agnès Antoine, ‘La conscience religieuse dans l’ère de la laïcité’, French Politics, 
Culture and Society, 20.3 (2002), pp. 115-20. 
6. Danièle Hervieu-Léger, ‘Sortie de la religion et recours à la transcendance’, 
French Politics, Culture and Society, 20.3 (2002), pp. 126-31. Marcel Gauchet also charac-
terizes this trend in a similar fashion: ‘Our individual agrees voluntarily with this 
splitting: he accepts the interpersonal norm as an order unto itself; he does not contest 
its general validity; he merely asks something else from it, a second order which 
doubles the first without interfering with it’ (in ‘Religion, éthique et démocratie’, 
Revue de théologie et de philosophie, 133 [2001], p. 464). 
7. This concept is discussed in some detail by Hugues Poltier in his article 
‘L’individu démocratique: réflexions à partir de l’oeuvre de Marcel Gauchet’, Revue de 
théologie et de philosophie, 133 (2001), pp. 487-96. 
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ciations. On the one hand, too much autonomy can lead to ethical de-
composition and a free-for-all voluntarism. On the other hand, a balanced 
‘theonomy’8 (a reconciliation between heteronomy and autonomy) may 
facilitate the creation of new conditions by which society can re-evaluate 
norms, both moral and religious. Hervieu-Léger cautions against both 
democratic implosion and religious confessionalism as a consequence of 
this prognosis, but what she does make clear is that laïcité in France 
today is under threat from a broad-based and intellectually potent 
religious lobby that wants to challenge laïcité’s authority, particularly in 
schools. The upshot of increased religious belief, coupled with a decline 
in the collective ‘being-together’ of democratic/political consensus, rep-
resents a greater role for religious inflection in issues of citizenship and 
sexuality. Hervieu-Léger claims that the reason for this return to religion 
in the lives of French citizens is because religion satisfies a deeper human 
and eternal search for absolutes and truth which are beyond the tried, 
tested and unfulfilling rationales of modern democratic political systems. 
Religion, she claims, answers a yearning for ‘an absolutism located in a 
radical otherness far removed from any connection with society’.9  
Secondly, what is significant about this return to religion, according to 
Gauchet and Antoine, is that truth derived from transcendence is not 
located in a spiritual exteriority; rather, transcendence is seen to emanate 
from individual experience. Antoine claims that individuals are less 
interested in seeking truth from transcendence in a spiritual other and 
more interested in experiencing ‘personally a feeling that has immediate 
effects in the here and now’.10 The implications of this thinking are note-
worthy in the light of current debates on gay marriage in France. 
Politically and juridically, the debate in favour of gay marriage has 
gained considerable momentum over recent years, culminating in 2004 
with the civic marriage of two gay men in the south-western town of 
Bègles, a ceremony approved and overseen by the town mayor Noël 
Mamère. Even though the marriage was subsequently annulled and the 
mayor temporarily suspended from his duties, this civic marriage had 
widespread support, even from unexpected quarters.11 As a disputed  
 
8. A notion developed by the Protestant theolgian Paul Tilich in which objective 
reason is underpinned by subjective emotion. 
9. Hervieu-Léger, ‘Sortie de la religion’, p. 130. 
10. Antoine, ‘La conscience religieuse’, p. 117. 
11. The Front National leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, welcomed the marriage of 
Bernard Charpentier and Sebastien Chapin with the phrase: ‘That there are men who 
love each other, well, why not?’, in Le Monde, 4 juin 2004.  
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and controversial ‘legal’ act in a secular context,12 this ceremony is 
nonetheless indicative of a cultural shift in sexual mores in France 
towards greater tolerance of gay marriage. It also reveals the relative 
ease with which the pro-marriage debate in secular France can further its 
cause by couching its argument in a legal context and thus push for anti-
discrimination legislation without direct opposition from the philosoph-
ical heavyweights of anthropology, psychoanalysis and the Vatican.13 In 
equal measure, there is a body of opinion within the legal profession and 
political classes that is receptive to gay marriage, which makes legaliza-
tion a long-term but realistic possibility. Clearly, the same cannot be said 
of religious and particularly Catholic intransigence towards any coup-
lings outside of marriage. However, as Antoine has intimated above, the 
conditions for a meaningful religious and sexual rapprochement in France 
are facilitated by Gauchet’s characterization of the new challenges facing 
laïcité today. Post-secularism, in which religion is defined outside religious 
institutions by self-regulating individuals in contexts where they have 
the possibilities to create their own truths and forms of transcendence, is 
reshaping the inter-relationship between religion and sexual ethics. 
Catholic Sexual Ethics 
In an article published in Le Monde on the 2 May 2004, Daniel Borrillo 
claimed that his campaign for gay marriage was founded exclusively on 
politics and the law, and not on religion. While recognizing that the 
Catholic church had played a significant role in the history of French 
politics, he positioned his argument in favour of gay marriage within the 
secularization of marriage as a religious sacrament after the Revolution: 
‘Marriage no longer depends on religious law but exclusively on civil 
law’.14 Furthermore, he wrote that it was in the context of ‘this civil act 
12. Much has been made in current debates in favour of gay marriage that the 
French Civil Code does not specifically describe marriage as between a man and a 
woman. Pro-gay marriage campaigners have highlighted this fact in their numerous 
campaigns and manifestos. Article 75 of the Civil Code states that a mayor ‘will 
receive from each party a declaration that they want to be husband or wife; he will 
pronounce, in the name of the law, that they are united in marriage, and the marriage 
act will be drawn up on the spot’. President Jacques Chirac has called for a national 
debate on the issue of gay marriage. 
13. I should qualify this remark by saying that those opposed to the legalization of 
gay marriage often use experts from these areas to support their arguments against 
the legalization of gay marriage. Also, the political, legal and institutional pressure 
brought to bear by these agents should not be underestimated. 
14. Daniel Borrillo, ‘Pourquoi le mariage homosexuel’, published in Le Monde, 2 
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that lesbians and gays need to proceed in recognition of the principles of 
equality before the law and the universality of the rule of law’.15 As a 
strategy designed to secure the legalization of gay marriage as a civil act 
in France, this move makes obvious and shrewd sense in that it provides 
the best way of achieving its political and legal goal. But it also throws 
into question the function of religious marriage in secular France. 
Clearly, the implication of Borrillo’s strategy is that religious marriage is 
outdated, if not an irrelevance, and therefore does not really figure in the 
political and legal ‘consecration’ of gay marriage in a secular society. 
However, his need to defend civil marriage against religious marriage 
belies some lingering suspicion of the wider significance of religious 
marriage in a country that is still Catholic in its Christian roots (although 
not in practice any more), and which still cultivates in its ecclesiastical 
hierarchy ultramontaine allegiance to Rome. Religious marriage enjoys a 
considerable cachet in most Catholic countries, and while political and 
social expediency may carry more weight among certain pockets of the 
population in respect of the practical and contractual obligations under-
pinning marriage, it is still a common perception that religious marriage 
holds a symbolic and mythical sway over Catholics, Christians and people 
in general.  
However, there is more to Borrillo’s strategy to distinguish gay mar-
riage as a civil act from its religious corollary. From a Christian, and 
specifically Vatican perspective, sexual ethics are defined within specific 
parameters and are anathema to the ethos, logic and contemporary 
expressions of sexuality and gender. Catholic sexual ethics are deter-
mined principally by what are described as objective standards based on 
the finality of the sexual act. In other words, sexual ethics are not an 
issue of personal, subjective, cultural experience or whim, but are defined 
by Divine (natural) law which is absolute and immutable, and which has 
as its dual meaning the unitive (man and woman) and procreative (family) 
functions of the conjugal act. In this sense, the Vatican sees its role today, 
in the context of sexual ethics, to promote the hierarchy of human 
sexuality within marriage by focusing ‘on the finality of the sexual act 
and on the principal criterion of its morality’.16 Before we address the 
nature of the conjugal act, let us examine some of the other relevant 
discourse on Catholic sexual ethics, which relates directly to Borrillo’s 
mai 2004. Consulted in August 2005 at the following website under the title ‘Pour le 
droit au mariage homosexuel’: www.lmsi.net  
15. Borrillo, ‘Pour le droit au mariage homosexuel’.  
16. ‘Persona Humana’ (5), Declaration on Certain Questions Concerning Sexual 
Ethics. Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Vatican, 29 December 1975. 
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political and legal strategy and which also highlights why, at least on the 
surface, there appears little room for a reconciliation between the two 
civil and religious positions.  
The Vatican’s emphasis on the immutability of Divine law in the 
determination of sexual ethics is a critical point of difference. The 
Vatican emphasizes the fact that its teaching on sexual ethics is related to 
principles and norms that ‘in no way owe their origin to a certain type of 
culture, but rather to knowledge of the Divine Law and of human 
nature. They therefore cannot be considered as having become out of 
date or doubtful under the pretext that a new cultural situation has 
arisen’.17 As such, culture and politics are perceived as transient pheno-
mena, if not ineffectual historical by-products, in the eternal and reli-
gious significance of sexual ethics; culture specifically, the Vatican 
claims, distorts sexuality by separating it from its essential reference to 
the person.18 It is significant that the Vatican in its defence of sexual 
ethics places considerable faith in this apolitical, acultural argument. 
This not only reinforces its hold on the keys of sexual ethics, but it is also 
an argument that is difficult to undermine, if not counteract. Its defence 
is founded on an unequivocal resistance to change, and is shored up by 
unqualified allegiance to scripture and an unquestioning faith in the 
infallibility of Divine law. As a defence, it appears full-proof from criti-
cism because of the perception of its mythic primordiality and the 
totality of its authority on sexual mores. 
Another but connected critical difference between Borrillo and the 
Vatican is the latter’s creation of a hierarchy of orders relating to 
subjective and objective acts. Freedom and consent are, as intimated 
earlier, not the true determinants of personal action from the perspective 
of the Curia. As such, freely chosen acts are classed as subjective and 
disordered acts, as opposed to objective acts that are predicated on self-
denial, self-control and the alienation of acts based on emotion or sincerity:  
The moral goodness of the acts proper to conjugal life, acts which are 
ordered according to true human dignity, ‘does not depend solely on 
sincere intentions or on an evaluation of motives. It must be determined by 
objective standards. These, based on the nature of the human person and 
his acts, preserve the full sense of mutual self-giving and human pro-
creation in the context of true love’.19  
17. ‘Persona Humana’, (5). 
18. ‘Familiaris Consortio’ (32), Apostolic Exhortation of John Paul II to the Episco-
pate, to the Clergy and to the Faithful of the Whole Catholic Church on the Role of the 
Christian Family in the Modern World, Vatican, 22 November 1981. 
19. ‘Persona Humana’, (5). 
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As with its claim to historical ownership of the origins of sexual ethics, 
the Vatican also hits out against those who try to justify sexual ethics 
based on subjective reasoning and not principled norms. In short, the 
Vatican opposes what it sees to be the excessive attention in contem-
porary society on individualism and the implicit focus on the individual 
subject in his self-determination, without necessary reference to social 
and objective standards and responsibilities. 
In the context of marriage, the differences between the Vatican and 
Borrillo are equally stark, but there are also areas where we can draw 
some common reflections and useful comparisons. Taking the differences 
first, sexual alterity is the defining feature of religious marriage. For the 
Vatican, the ‘genital’ act only has a meaning within the framework of 
marriage between a man and a woman, with its attendant final pro-
creative function. Without this, sincerity and fidelity are not ensured. 
Similarly, ‘real’ love finds its safeguard in religious marriage. Without 
this safeguard, there can be no approved paternal or maternal love for 
children. Equally, ‘real’ freedom of action in the Vatican sense, maligned 
in secular society because of the perceived constraint placed on it by the 
fidelity of marriage, is on the contrary defined and guaranteed within 
the objective standard of marriage and fidelity. To this degree, the 
Vatican is keen to downgrade consent and freedom as arbiters of personal 
agency outside the pale of objective order; hence its creation of the 
supremacy of the ‘loi de l’esprit’ (‘objective order’) over the ‘loi du 
péché’ (‘subjective order’). In addition, complementarity (difference) of 
the sexes is crucially that which distinguishes religious heterosexual 
marriage from gay marriage. This anthropological principle underpins 
all Vatican thinking on marriage. And linked to its primordiality is the 
relationship it forms with society; complementarity (leading to hetero-
sexual marriage and the family) is considered a ‘social good’. This 
differentiates the union of heterosexual marriage from all other factual 
unions (concubinage for example) which are described in the private 
interest and not of benefit to social progress.  
However, beyond these normative and exclusive definitions of marriage 
and its universal and immutable preconditions, ‘amor coniugalis’ is also 
defined in more general terms as ‘essentially a relationship’, ‘a common 
and stable arrangement’, and also as ‘an issue worthy of recognition in 
justice’.20 While these terms, on a first reading, open up more generous 
comparisons with gay couples and other sexual couplings, they repre-
sent no more than a preamble to the more doctrinal pre-conditions for 
20. ‘Family, Marriage and “De Facto” Unions’, The Pontifical Council for the 
Family, Vatican, 26 July 2000. 
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religious marriage, and particularly the final reference made to justice. 
The use of the term ‘justice’ is significant because it raises concerns about 
what form this justice might take, and how it might shadow the juridic 
concept of justice in the argument of Borrillo. I think it is safe to say here 
that the justice to which the Vatican is referring is justice linked to 
natural law and its absolute and immutable value, as well as the contrac-
tual and legal foundation in law of religious marriage: ‘This is a basic 
principle: in order to be real and free conjugal love, love must be trans-
formed into one that is due in justice through the free act of marital 
consent’.21 The Vatican’s position on this issue needs some clarification. 
We have seen up to this point that the Vatican undermines the subjective 
element in the binary of objective and subjective acts. This, however, is 
not designed to devalue the category per se of the subjective or the ‘inter-
personal reality’ of marriage.22 The juridic dimension to marriage, the 
Vatican claims, is not ‘juxtaposed as something foreign to the interpers-
onal reality of marriage, but constitutes a truly intrinsic dimension of it’.23 
In other words, and as a consequence of Vatican II, the Vatican is keen to 
dispel the notion that the juridic dimension of marriage (in its Divine 
law interpretation) is opposed to or unconnected with the dignity of the 
personal. On the contrary, the Vatican adheres to the enshrinement in 
law of the personal (through marriage, fidelity and the sanctity of the 
body), but crucially this enshrinement is overridden by the power 
invested in it by the higher order of Divine law. With justice connected 
to ‘true’ freedom of choice and authenticity in the objective order, the 
Vatican reinforces its argument of exclusive rights on the original template 
of human relations defined through marriage. It uses this argument to 
deflect attention away from the potential validity of other types of union 
created either by state or public consensus:  
This would be an arbitrary use of power which does not contribute to the 
common good because the original nature of marriage and the family 
proceeds and exceeds, in an absolute and radical way, the sovereign power 
of the State.24  
By virtue of believing it has the original design on human life, pre-
scribed by Divine Law, the Vatican enjoys a privileged, exclusive but 
problematic role in denying other types of human arrangements any 
equivalence with heterosexual marriage.  
21. ‘Family, Marriage and “De Facto” Unions’, III (22). 
22. ‘Dignitas connubii’ (‘On the Dignity of Marriage’), Pontifical Council for 
Legislative Texts, The Catholic Truth Society, 2005, p. 6. 
23. ‘Dignitas connubii’, p. 6. 
24. ‘Family, Marriage and “De Facto” Unions’, II (9). 
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We can see from this analysis of the Vatican’s sexual ethics that the 
political and legal case for gay marriage made by Daniel Borrillo (and 
others) faces a difficult challenge to compete on the same playing field as 
the Vatican. I will address shortly some of the counter-arguments and 
strategies advanced by Borrillo and the wider pro-gay marriage cam-
paigners in France. But at this juncture, I want to raise some of the 
ethical implications of the Vatican position on sexual ethics, and point to 
some areas where current theological and ethical debates can shed new 
insights. In the context of orthodox Catholic sexual ethics, there is clearly 
no room for manoeuvre in debating the case for gay marriage. First, 
marriage is locked into the axis of complementarity. Secondly, individ-
ualism and expressions of personal autonomy/specificity are overridden 
by invariable universals. Thirdly, the idea of gender, the cornerstone of 
contemporary shifts in concepts of sexuality and sexual difference, is 
described by the Vatican as part of a ‘process of cultural and human des-
truction of the institution of marriage’.25 Defined also as an ‘ideology’, 
the Vatican perceives gender as being mainly responsible for the socio-
political advances in equality of rights between gay marriage (concubinage) 
and heterosexual marriage. The religious implications of the Vatican’s 
stance are considerable, particularly in the light of Gauchet’s earlier 
characterization of a post-laïque France, with the rise in religious belief 
and the triumph of what he calls the ‘metaphysics of autonomy’.26 
Surely, the Vatican would welcome any movement towards a greater 
role for religion in individuals’ lives. While this may be the case, it is 
equally clear that it has expressed caution over aspects of the post-
secular agenda, notably its tolerance of new ageism and different forms 
of ‘do-it-yourself’ religion. In short, in the objective/subjective stakes, 
post-secularism is low in the Vatican’s estimations. Antoine, we recall, 
also highlighted the trend towards the experience of transcendence in 
the form of social and personal immanence, with greater degrees of 
flexibility in respect of sexual and religious citizenship. With religion 
playing a more prominent role in the debates of the day and in the daily 
lives of individual citizens,27 there is a case to be made that the return to 
religion is indicative of a trend towards the pursuit of something other 
than social democracy as a component to individual fulfilment. This is 
Antoine’s and Gauchet’s argument.  
Equally, in the case of Catholic sexual ethics, and the perception of a 
return to theological rigour under the pontificate of Bendict XVI, it could 
25. ‘Family, Marriage and “De Facto” Unions’, I (8). 
26. Gauchet, ‘Religion, éthique et démocratie’, p. 457. 
27. Hervieu-Léger, ‘Sortie de la religion’, p. 130. 
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be argued that a more orthodox approach to sexual mores may also be 
what citizens are calling for to redress some of the excesses of postmodern 
relativism. I think, however, that the situation is more complex. It is my 
estimation that the return to religion in France and beyond is part of a 
more profound post-secular phenomenon in which contemporary 
theology (as opposed to Catholic doctrine) has detected a demise in the 
value of truth, and has sought to re-appropriate truth from secularism 
and postmodern nihilism via the rational possibility of an indeterminacy 
that is not chaos but an infinite order in which humanity (in all its 
diversity) and time participate. In this sense, the Vatican’s cherished 
concept of finitude in the context of marriage is radicalized by a desire to 
show the possibilities of infinity in the finite, which in turn opens out 
doctrine to human and an authentically different religious hermeneutic. 
A related feature of this hermeneutic for sexual ethics is that sexual 
diversity, normally the antithesis to orthodoxy, is invested with new 
meaning, celebrated within the wider realm of infinity, and seen to be 
compatible with new radical and theological thinking.28 Similarly, sex 
(in both its agapeistic and erotic dimensions) is reconnected in a way 
that sexual difference ‘has some meaning in the Trinitarian 
differentiation with God… We can see divinely grounded difference 
within the homosexual because the difference between the sexes does 
not exhaust theologically significant difference’.29 In short, in the wider 
political, cultural and post-secular contexts of rights to private interest 
and autonomous individualism, citizens want to be able to feel 
integrated socially and theologically in respect of their sexual identities, 
and free to live their sexual diversity within a fulfilling, meaningfully 
relevant religious framework. The reality, of course, from a strict 
Catholic tradition, is very different. But, on the positive side, the shifts in 
the contemporary French cultural and religious landscape have been 
accompanied by ethical and theological insights, with innovative 
thinking on the value of ethical intuitionism/pragmatism over Kantian 
imperative, the questioning of the relevance of a priori norms and moral 
codification, and the increasing accommodation of a reconstruction of 
ethical responsibility around notions of particularism and ethical 
intention. I will come to these issues in the final section of this article 
specifically as a way of exploring how they might facilitate a different 
u
28. These are the main ideas underpinning the radical theologies of the British 
academics John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward in their co-edited 
work Radical Orthodoxy: Suspending the Material (London: Routledge, 1998). 
29. McLoughlin in Milbank et al. (eds.), Radical Orthodoxy. 
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The Politics of Gay Marriage in France 
The debate on gay marriage in France has been conducted on three main 
levels. On the first level are those who question the very need for gay 
marriage. When Mayor Noël Mamère sanctioned the first gay civil 
marriage in France in 2004, he received unqualified support from the 
majority of gay associations on the point of principle that gay marriage is 
just and that his actions represented a much-needed ‘gesture of civil 
disobedience’.30  Some, however, were critical of the means by which he 
chose to advance the case for gay marriage, particularly the way he 
reduced the issue to a juridic debate on the interpretation of the civil 
code.31 There were other and more prominent dissenting voices, most 
notably from Denis Quinqueton (Président du Collectif PaCS) and Jan-
Paul Pouliquen (Initiateur du PaCS). In a joint statement entitled ‘Rien 
ne sert de marier, il faut pacser à point’, they denounced the way mar-
riage had now been forced on the gay ‘community’ and criticized the 
gay marriage strategy as weak and not ‘relevant to modern times’.32 
Both concurred that the best way forward for equality of rights for gays 
and lesbians was not to revert to an outdated strategy from the 1970s (i.e. 
the mythic right of equivalence defined in marriage) but to ‘forge ahead 
with improvements to the PaCS’.33 The ideas underpinning the 
Quinqueton and Pouliquen statement are part of a wider currency of 
opinion that sees marriage as a sop to heteronormativity, an indication 
of dependence on heterosexual marriage and as part of a trend towards a 
culture of normalization that many prominent academics on French gay 
and queer studies want to disp
lf-sufficient and subversive gay identity.34  
Another dissenting voice at the time took a similar line when he 
advanced the thesis (perhaps overlooked today) that ‘one of the advan-
tages of homosexuality was that it represented an alternative to the 
30.  Stéphanie Noblet, ‘L’intensi
ys’, Le Monde, 4 juin 2004, p. 16. 
31. Noblet, ‘L’intensité du débat’, p. 16. 
32. Noblet, ‘L’intensité du débat’, p. 16. 
33. Noblet, ‘L’intensité du débat’, p. 16. 
34. For more on this subversive trend in French gay studies, see my book The Ga
publ c: Citizenship, Sexuality and Subversion in France (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005). 
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 in France, he makes a valid case for 
an
35. Benoît Duteurtre, ‘Noce gay pour petits-bourgeois’, Libération, 2 juin 2004, p. 35. 
established norms of marriage and the family’.35 The interesting point of 
Benoît Duteurtre’s article is not to downplay any of the arguments in 
favour of gay marriage or gay families (‘All the arguments are good 
ones’, he confirms), but rather to lament the passing of an identity synony-
mous with sexual freedom: ‘Rather than let sexual freedom prosper and 
flourish, gays today rare trying to make it fit into old boxes’. In France’s 
currently politicized and militant culture surrounding gay activism, this 
nostalgic view of gay sexuality would be cast aside as the decadent 
observations of a fin-de-siècle aesthete. That said, Duteurtre, like 
Quinqueton and Pouliquen, sides with the PaCS as the sensible way 
forward for lesbians and gays (including rights to adoption), and ques-
tions ultimately how marriage can be of benefit to lesbians and gays. 
Duteurtre’s notion of a gay identity may have some resonance with 
older gay people or academics who privilege theories of gay essentialism 
and sameness of desire, but, no matter how off beam Duteurtre may be 
in the current socio-political climate
 opt-out clause to gay marriage. 
On the second level, there is the political gay lobby for whom the 
normalization of gayness and gay lifestyle via gay marriage is the politi-
cal goal. As we saw with Daniel Borrillo, the political debate in favour of 
gay marriage is based on equality of rights and the right to a family, the 
end to discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, the right to full 
representation of gays and lesbians as individuals and communities 
within participatory universalism, the historical democratization of the 
institution of marriage, and the growing global consensus on the acces-
sion of lesbians and gays to marriage.36 The force of the political argu-
ment is not only grounded in the logic of equality and democratic 
citizenship, but this logic has acquired a momentum that is having a 
dual effect. First, there is the growing impression that gay marriage is so 
widely approved within secular society that it is only a matter of time 
before it becomes legal. Secondly, there is also the perception that the 
political and legal case for gay marriage has overshadowed in priority 
and in relevance the religious objections to it, relegating the role of the 
Vatican to that of an audible but isolated conscientious objector. These 
 
36. ‘Belgium (2003), the Netherlands (2000) and soon Sweden and Spain allow 
homosexuals to marry. In Canada, gay marriages have been celebrated in Ontario and 
British Columbia since 2003. In the USA, thanks to a decision by the Supreme Court of 
Massachusetts, mayors cannot refuse to marry gays from May 2004’, Libération, 7 juin 
2004, p. 20. I should point out that this is marriage in a civil context, not a religious 
context, although there are in some of the above countries religious blessings that 
accompany/follow the civil contract.  
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perceptions are reinforced by the ways in which religion has been 
systematically cleansed from the pro-gay marriage debate. Borrillo, in 
particular, has secularized and lega
quently stripped it as an ‘institution’ of its familial, symbolic and 
reproductive links with filiation.37  
It is at this point that the debate moves to a third level, namely the 
philosophical implications of gay marriage for wider debates on the 
difference between the sexes and symbolic order. The two leading expo-
nents of this debate are Borrillo himself, and Eric Fassin, a tireless 
champion of gay marriage.38 In his article ‘Pour un débat sur le mariage 
hétérosexuel’,39 Borrillo outlines part of his strategic approach to the 
debate on gay marriage, namely the attempt to expose some of the 
inconsistencies in heterosexual religious marriage on issues relating to 
procreation, sterility, impotence and the menopause, which he then uses 
to undermine the ‘authority’ of heterosexual marriage and its function as 
a benchmark for gay marriage. His argument raises a host of crucial and 
debatable issues outside the remit of this article on the political implica-
tions for French society of an equivalence between homosexuality and 
heterosexuality, and the role of the (gay) family. Eric Fassin presents his 
case for the promotion of gay marriage in the context of this equivalence. 
His argument (essentially a political one, although its substance involves 
wider definitions of sex and sexuality) is that the only way to challenge 
the difference between the sexes is to shift the goalposts from essential 
difference to gendered difference, and advance the debate on gay marriage 
as a struggle for equality between heterosexuality and homosexuality. 
Strategically, this has proved very effective in highlighting gay marriage 
as a debate around equality, gender and justice, and as an issue that, for 
Fassin, raises critically the fears and insecurities that accompany ‘the 
anthropological risk that comes with blurring the boundaries between 
the sexes’.40 Fassin’s approach reveals the intrinsic value of addressing 
gay marriage from a political perspective; politics embraces equality, 
democracy and justice as arbiters of change, and Fassin underlines the 
consensuality within politics as a challenge to sexual, symbolic and 
psychoanalytic norms. In short, Fassin’s use of the politics of gay mar-
riage acquires a legitimacy that responds with effectiven
37. Borrillo, ‘Pour le droit au mariage homosexuel’. 
38. See in this respect his seminal co-edited work with Daniel Borrillo and Marcela 
Iacub, Au-delà du PaCS: L’expertise familiale à l’épreuve de l’homosexualité (Paris: PUF, 
1999). 
39. Borrillo, ‘Pour un débat sur le mariage hétérosexuel’, Libération, 2 juin 2004, p. 36. 
40. Eric Fassin, ‘Le mariage des homosexuels : Politique comparée des normes 
franco-américaines’, French Politics, Culture and Society, 17.3-4 (1999), p. 173. 
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Ethics and Theology in Post-secular France 
The politics of gay marriage shakes the hegemony of complementarity, 
challenges concepts of justice, gives greater credence and legitimacy to 
autonomous action, and also facilitates greater flexibility between univ-
ersal norms and individual behaviour. However, we have seen that 
orthodox Catholic sexual ethics refutes the transience of politics and its 
claims to moral legitimacy, and demotes the subjectivity of personal 
decision-making. But, on closer inspection, we can see that within strands 
of Catholic sexual ethics and related debates on gay marriage there are 
areas of innovative thinking. Before I look at the French context, I would 
like to address, as a point of comparison, gay marriage as portrayed in 
North America. Eugene Rogers, one of the leading exponents of religious 
gay marriage, has taken the debate to unprecedented limits.41 The 
central thematic of Rogers’ thesis is the move away from an 
understanding of natural law as founded in Divine Revelation towards 
natural law as human knowledge of God’s will. This transference shifts 
the parameters of the debate on the relationship between person and 
God away from human subservience to God’s will to that of the human 
exploration of what constitutes God’s will. Clearly, such a shift bestows 
considerable autonomy on human knowledge and intuition. For Rogers, 
it also opens up a hermeneutic that incorporates lesbians and gays into 
what he terms God’s ‘triune life’.42 David Matzko McCarthy argues that 
if lesbians and gays are persons loved by God, then ‘God is committed, 
in unmerited grace, to take their bodies—somehow—as means rather than 
impediments to that communion’.43 The implicatio
ch there are many, are that bodies are described as communicat
s open to meaning, redefinition and salvation. Similarly, marriage
hristian tradition, is viewed as a form of redemption, and  
gay and lesbian couples are called to give over 
41. Eugene F. Rogers, Sexuality and the Christian Body (Oxford: 
d Rogers (ed.), Theology and Sexuality (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). 
42. Rogers, ‘S
xuality, p. 201. 
43. David Matzko McCarthy, ‘The Relationship of Bodies: A Nuptial Herm
tics of Same-Sex Unions’, in Rogers (ed.), Theology and
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of the body is the hermeneutical [meaning-bearing or significant] version 
of gaining one’s life by losing it, the core of Christianity’s understanding of 
giving oneself over to God’s creative activity.44 
I have used the example of Rogers and McCarthy for several reasons. 
They give a meaning to gay marriage within the Christian terms of a 
triune understanding of God, redemption and sacrifice. But they also 
focus on a central pillar of not only their own theological constructions 
of marriage but also of Catholic sexual ethics, namely celibacy (and 
chastity). In ‘Familiaris Consortio’, the Vatican refers to celibacy as a 
charism. Chastity, it states, is the virtue that expresses capability of 
respecting the nuptial meaning of the body. Significantly, the Vatican 
also describes celibacy as the supreme form of self-giving, the very 
meaning of sexuality and higher in standing to marriage: ‘It is for this 
reason that the Church, throughout her history, has always def
riority of this charism to that of marriage, by reason of the who
ular link which it has with the Kingdom of God’.45 For the Vatic
elibate is clearly defined in terms of a body waiting for 
the eschatological marriage of Christ with the Church, giving himself or 
herself completely to the Church in the hope that Christ may give Himself 
to the Church in the full truth of eternal life. The celibate person thus 
anticipates in his or her flesh the new world of the future resurrection.46  
The celibate acts as a guardian of the consciousness of the mystery of 
marriage and defends it from any reduction or impoverishment. 
Celibacy, from this perspective, is a state of suspended asexuality, in 
which the body is desexualized of any physical or human desire. How-
ever, Rogers extends this function of celibacy/asceticism to an interpre-
tation of marriage. For him, the aim of the ascetic life is to imitate the 
suffering of God’s human love, and God’s will to liberate human beings 
for love. As such, ascetic practice, while a discipline of self-denial, does 
not eclipse the sexuality of the individual. On the contrary, for Rogers, 
God transforms and transfigures the sex and sexuality of the ascetic. In 
the same way, marriage as an ascetic practice transforms the sexuality 
(heterosexual or homosexual) of the couple so as to allow the couple to 
model the love between Christ and Church. In this way, God is seen to 
use these bodies to redeem them (and their sexuality) and sanctify them. 
In short, for Roge
king up sexual desire into honest ascetic practice. In human terms, 
44. McCarthy, ‘The Relationship o
45. ‘Familiaris Consortio’, II (16). 
46. ‘Familiaris Consortio’, II (16). 
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therefore, sexuality cannot be passed by; it must be ‘assumed’ and 
‘transfigured’.47  
The value of Rogers’ contribution to the sexual ethics and theological 
significance of gay marriage is considerable on multiple levels. First, his 
rewriting of natural law inspires a discourse of communication between 
respective human and godly wills. Natural law is not therefore exclu-
sively based on scripture, or conditional on divine revelation. Secondly, 
in his promotion of a theological vision of gay marriage, Rogers iden-
tifies the centrality of desire and sexuality within the divine will of God 
to redeem and bring all persons into His triune life. This recognition of 
desire (eros) and its direct connection with love (agape) reinforces not 
only the key role for desire in his theology of marriage but also how 
desire and sexuality have theological meaning outside the norm of 
complementarity. Thirdly, his definition of marriage as an ascetic 
practice in the Christian tradition is critical because it embraces and 
transfigures without discrimination the sexual dimension of the human 
being in the pursuit of a higher marriage with Christ who offers full 
redemption and grace. In this context, Rogers’ theology of gay marriage 
overrides the Vatican condition that heterosexual marriage represents 
the only framework in which the finality of the specific function of sex-
uality (i.e. procreation) can take place. Rogers defines marriage beyond 
the finality of the procreative act in the infinite redemption and sanctifi-
cation of Christ. In short, Rogers, in attem
eology and the ethically charged postmodern discourse of sexual 
orientation, gender and identity, offers a theological model for gay 
marriage which thrives on the diversity of human nature and sexuality 
for its salvific and redemptive function. 
In France, the closest comparison with this model of Christian ascetic-
ism is in the work of Michel Foucault. However, where Rogers’ thesis is 
designed to incorporate sexuality in a theological justification of gay 
marriage, Foucault’s task is to be liberated from what he sees as the 
tyranny of sexuality. While Foucault does not address the issue of gay 
marriage per se, the points of comparison with Rogers are in their 
ay f r the transfiguration of human sexuality. For Foucault, the value 
of Christian asceticism is not measured in deference to a purifying 
alterity,48 but in the knowledge acquired through the techniques of self-
 
47. Rogers, ‘Sanctification’, pp. 223-25. 
48. In his writings on the ‘Hermeneutics of the Self’ (Political Theory, 21 [1993], pp. 
198-227), ‘Sexualité et solitiude’ (Dits et écrits, 4; Paris: Gallimard, 1994, pp. 168-78) 
and ‘Le Combat de la chasteté’ (Communications, 35; Sexualités occidentales, ed. Phili
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a way of managing sexuality by ridding oneself of the power of the other. This 
involved a ‘task’ that each person had to undergo in order to overcome the construc-
tion of sexuality imposed from without as part of a process of self-reinvention. 
analysis that allow one to create ‘an ethos of creative renunciation’.49 It is 
not as though Foucault was against gay marriage or gay culture (he 
preferred a desexualized gayness), but more that asceticism provided a 
framework in which to self-manage sexuality and rechannel sexual 
energies towards other types of affective friendship.50 In this sense, 
sexual ethics for Foucault, predicated on what he called the ascetic 
imperative, targeted primarily the self and not other people or a superior 
other. Eugene Rogers, on the other hand, sees in the ascetic of marriage a 
process of theological inclusion for lesbians and gays and the redemp-
tion of their sexuality through alterity. The critical difference, therefore, 
between Foucault and Rogers is the power invested in alterity. For 
Rogers, it is theologically and sexually transformative; for Foucault, 
alterity is a form of blackmail that lures one into a comfort zone of other-
ness, whereas the real task of sexuality is to ‘produce oneself’ outside 
conventional categorizations of sex and alterity. In ethical terms, Rogers’ 
asceticism of gay marriage is an ethics of sexual sacrifice. For Foucault, 
the ascetic imperative is an ethics of self-discovery. 
I have used this discussion between Rogers and Foucault because at its 
heart is the key role and function of alterity on human experience and 
this has important implications for current ethical and theological debates. 
Ethics and theology continue to play an important role even in secular 
societies in debates on abortion and euthanasia. In what has been 
described as our post-secular context, where the profile of religion has 
been enhanced, it is logical that ethics and theology play an even more 
prominent role in the lives of human beings. But, while this may be the 
case, it is the context and the parameters within which religious discourse 
is expressed that have changed. In Marcel Gauchet’s portrait of contemp-
orary France, individual autonomies have eclipsed the perspective of a 
universal morality. He states that the loss of an overview on morality has 
itself nourished a distrust in the function of morality; hence the emer-
gence of what he calls diverse forms of moral behaviour and their 
independence. In short, while the balance in the perspective on moral 
 
Ariès and André Béjin, May 1982, pp. 15-25), Foucault defined sexual ethics in terms 
of self-control and self-knowledge. In this sense, he used the model of the Christian 
ascetic as a way of exploring the stages towards the disinvolvement of the will, and as 
49. Mark Vernon, ‘“I am not what I am”: Foucault, Christian Asceticism and a 
“Way Out” of Sexuality’, in Jeremy R. Carrette (ed.), Religion and Culture by Michel 
Foucault (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), p. 201. 
50. Vernon, ‘“I am not what I am”’, pp. 200-10. 
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behaviour has shifted towards independence and individualism, 
Gauchet characterizes the situation as the co-existence of two horizons, 
one individual and one collective. However, in spite of this perception of 
coexistence, it is clear from the language deployed that individual 
existence (now ‘integrally autonomised’51) is dictating the moral land-
scape: ‘A new space opens up—where, for the first time, individual exis-
tence is integrally autonomised as a space with its own end in itself and 
without any other horizon than its own—alongside the space of coexist-
ence’.52 Gauchet goes on to fill out the profile of this postmodern autono-
mous individual by saying that he represents the end of the previous 
and heroic modern individual who tried to personalize social rules, and 
acquire a measure of responsibility to the social space. On the contrary, 
postmodern man does not recognize the general/collective, but accepts 
its existence alongside him. Clearly, Gauchet laments this changing of 
the guard because it augurs in an era of excessive individualism which 
has been anathema to his vision of politics replacing religion, and 
democracy being the new alterity in which citizens would find all the 
answers to their needs in the social production of equality of conditions 
for all. But what is especially significant about Gauchet’s depiction of 
contemporary F
auchet’s terminology) have effectively banished the notion of alterity 
as an unrealizable and unattainable other, and relocated it in the integral 
autonomy of the individual, in essentially a form of Foucauldian self-
determination. 
The reality of gay marriage (at least in its religious dimension) is a 
distant one in the context of current Catholic and Christian ethics and 
theology. But more radical thinking has served to widen the parameters 
of the ethical and theological debate, and open up new ground in which 
a serious case for gay marriage can be made. The implications of Gauchet’s 
analysis, for example, are profound and wide-ranging. They reflect a 
broader consensus within current ethical and alternative theological 
thinking in respect of the suspension of alterity as a conditional other. 
Significantly, however, the suspension of alterity implies an adherence to 
religion, not as a transcendent other to which meaning is exclusively 
attached, but as a transcendence in practice; in other words, an end to 
the hegemony of alterity as expressed in God’s will, doctrinal orthodoxy, 
norm and universal code, and the beginning of an expression of alterity 
shaped by communitarian needs and values. Denis Müller has argued 
for this type of religious practice in his ethics of responsibility where 
51. Gauchet, ‘Religion, éthique et démocratie’, p. 464.  
52. Gauchet, ‘Religion, ethique et democratie’, p. 464. 
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individuals respond integrally to their acts. What this means for Müller is 
that individuals bring the power, integrity and commitment, tradition-
ally invested in transcendence, to bear on the immanence of daily exper-
ience, a notion he calls ‘an authentic experience of transcendence-in-and-
for immanence’.53 Müller’s concept is useful in that it provides a frame-
work in which to take control of ethical decision-making in respect of 
individual lives and behaviour (responding integrally to acts) and recon-
figure it within a discourse that does no
ent of failure or excuses. In short, from Müller’s perspective, tran-
scendence only works as a discourse if individuals deepen and radicalize 
their responsibility to their own actions; in this sense, transcendence 
does not disappear, it is democratized. 
Müller’s democratization of transcendence forms part of a wider argu-
ment about the relationship between norms and ethics. Müller, in the 
context of bioethics, challenges the dominance of the ‘bioethical para-
digm’ and its exclusive scientific basis, by introducing a theological 
dimension into the debate. This is not done in order to open up an 
argument between liberal laïcité and Christian confessionalism in France, 
but rather to highlight what he terms a more essential and necessary 
‘renovated theological ethics’.54 This renovated ethics forms part of his 
integral approach to transcendence. Müller is careful not to interpret his 
‘theological ethics’ as encouraging the promotion of truth in the form of 
a universal common morality. It is aimed rather at enlightening what he 
calls ‘the sense of moral value and the direction of ethical intention’.55 
Theological ethics for Müller are not dictates. They are part of a proce-
dural repositioning of religious values and a philosophical reinstatement 
of the necessity of a theological dimension to ethics. Crucially, however, 
this theological ethics is also part of two wider important phenomena. 
The first is the growing consensus around the reinvention of the 
modern/post-modern inspired by a new religious vision (i.e. the post-
53. Denis Müller, ‘La bioéthique au péril de Dieu: pour une critique théologique 
de la maîtrise éthique sur le vivant’, Revue de théologie et de philosophie, 134 (2002), p. 
339. Müller refuses to be forced to choose between transcendence and immanence. He 
is aware of the dangers of siding exclusively with transcendence over immanence 
(and the implicit accusations of suspension of intelligence and reason). Hence, his 
strategy is to formulate an expression that highlights the aims and objectives of a 
‘transcendence in immanence’ compromise. 
54. Müller, ‘La bioéthique au péril de Dieu’, p. 331. 
55. Denis Müller, ‘L’acceuil de l’autre et le souci de soi: la dialectique de la subject-
ivité et de l’alterité comme thème de l’éthique’, Revue de théologie et de philosophie, 123 
(1991), p. 199. 
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the process of moral codification and normativity: ‘ethical intention … 
specifically in the way it invokes a self-constitution of the subject and is 
not solely determined by its intentional target, precedes the process of 
moral codification (normativity, relation to the law)’.56 There are several 
strands to this argument that need clarification before we progress. In 
speaking of Foucault, Müller concurs generally with the Foucauldian 
position of morals oriented on ethics as opposed to morals oriented on 
code. But it is the relationship between ethics and norms that raises 
concerns for Müller. As we recall, Foucault’s sexual ethics was an ethics 
of self-denial and a rejection of alterity, including to a degree the human 
other (as his ascetic imperative suggests). Müller disputes this rejectionism, 
claiming that the relationship between ethics and norms (code) cannot be 
negated or deferred. The critical distinction between Müller and Foucault, 
and important for us, is that Müller founds his ethics on an equal 
acknowledgement of the human other, a recognition of the ‘alterity that 
is immanent to oneself, like a dimension of one’s “ipséité” ’.57 In the case 
of Foucault, ‘respect for the other seems subordinate to a logic of the 
“Même” ’.58 For Müller, this difference is vital. In his case, it confirms his 
central idea that ethical intention and moral norm ‘do
other, but reciprocate and complete each other’.59 On the other hand, 
Foucault’s position is predicated on self-awareness as a condition of 
opening or engagement with a respect for the other. 
Both Müller and Foucault recognize the existence of the other as norm 
but to different degrees and with divergent performative functions. 
Both, however, place value on the independent role of ethical intention, 
its autonomous function in the ethical process, and its critical power as 
counter agent to normativity. Importantly, intention (‘ethical aim’60) has 
become a key element of a wider and more radical theological binary in 
which universal code is paired against autonomous action. Eric Fuchs 
discusses this relationship in a series of articles.61 His premise is that 
ethics is a universal obligation for everyone, and thus he argues for a 
universal ethics and not a return to a subjectivity of personal convictions. 
In this sense, he puts forward a strong case for the defence of a ‘ethical 
56. Müller, ‘L’acceuil de l’autre et le souci de soi’, p. 203. 
57. Müller, ‘L’acceuil de l’autre et le souci de soi’, p. 205. 
58. Müller, ‘L’acceuil de l’autre et le souci de soi’, p. 206. 
59. Müller, ‘L’acceuil de l’autre et le souci de soi’, p. 206. 
60. Müller, ‘L’acceuil de l’autre et le souci de soi’, p. 195. 
61. Eric Fuchs, ‘Entre raison et conviction: la place de l’éthique dans la société 
moderne’, Revue de théologie et de philosophie, 120 (1988), pp. 453-63; ‘Quelle universalité 
pour l’éthique dans une société pluraliste: une réflexion théologique’, Revue de 
théologie et de philosophie, 128 (1996), pp. 357-66. 
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universalism’ against pluralism, modernity and postmodernity. However, 
part of Fuchs’ defence is a pragmatic approach to the renunciation of any 
systematic ‘christian morality’ imposed from without, and the promotion 
of an ethics beyond the pale of norms and codes. Fuchs acknowledges 
that the universal approach to ethics has led to a crisis in contemporary 
ethical debate, and particularly to the abstraction of the individual who 
he describes as cut off from history, culture and context. Fuchs’ compro-
mise, therefore, is to strike a balance between a respect for difference and 
specificity (and its theological inclusion), and the ‘corrective’ influence of 
a ‘defence of a moral universal’.62 This may not seem the most honour-
able of balances, but it does represent a wider revisionist trend towards a 
rapprochement between ethics as pragmatics/intuition and obj
tionality. For other thinkers, this balance can often be articulated at the 
point of a search for the ‘just solution’63 or the advancement of a universal 
ethics that inscribes itself within the broad brush of pluralism.64 
Post-secularism poses a unique dilemma for the Catholic church, 
Christianity and religion in general in contemporary France. In advoca-
ting a return to religion, albeit outside the confines of orthodoxy and 
institutionalism, the post-secular thesis cannot expect to overturn centu-
ries of doctrine and Catholic sexual ethics, despite the pull of evolution 
and progress. Its methodology is more progressive and democratic, 
bringing into a closer proximity the vertical aspirations towards tran-
scendence and the horizontal forces of citizenship, gender and social 
reality. To this degree, politically and democratically, the case for gay 
marriage is well advanced in France, if not an immanent fait accompli. 
Ironically, however, in religious circles where one might have expected 
the impact of post-secularism to offer chinks of insight into a meaningful 
accommodation between established norm and sexual diversity, gay 
marriage is still denounced as a pathological disorder and a grave error. 
And yet, we have discovered in the course of this article that the broad 
outlines of a template for gay religious marriage are visible in branches 
of ethical debate and theological thinking. Post-secularism has brought 
religion in from the cold of modernity, conferring on it a new democratic 
halo. But this is not to imply that traditional religion will follow suit and 
62. Fuchs, ‘Quelle universalité’, p. 365. 
63. Hugues Poltier, ‘Le pragmatisme: solution au problème moral de la modernité’, 
Revue de théologie et de philosophie, 126 (1994), p. 357. 
64. This approach is the one advocated by Eugene F. Rogers and some American 
scholars. Their idea is that norms are too absolute and prescriptive. They prefer a 
more relative approach to debates on norms in which ethics are more character-
oriented, and where norms are transferable, flexible and based on praxis and human 
interaction. 
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xuality is a salutary reminder of the value not only of 
celibacy (as an alternative to marriage as well as a possible condition of 
marriage), but also of the transformative value and transfigurative power 
of individual will. 
democratize its institutions. The thrust of the post-secular thesis has 
en its capacity to advance unilaterally beyond this ‘waiting game’, and 
ignite its own fire in the hearts and minds of individual citizens 
regardless of denomination, ethnicity, sexual orientation or difference. 
In practically theological terms, the transfer of attention away from 
transcendence as other to its immanent connectedness with daily life and 
experience informs us that individuals are calling for a religious corrob-
oration to their diverse social and sexual experiences, whether in the 
form of gay marriage or women priests or the use of condoms for the 
prevention of AIDS in Africa. Underpinning many of these experiences 
is the critical but controversial reinstatement of individual will at the 
heart of post-secularism and new ethical debate, and its demand for 
recognition as an agent of responsibility, integrity and authenticity, and 
not whim and uncontrolled autonomy. This demand represents one of 
the fundamental shifts in perception in the new sexual, ethical and 
theological landscape of today. Individual will and its authenticity, 
currently the scourge of Vatican doctrine, has now become the new and 
entrusted arbiter of ethical and theological negotiation. As many of the 
commentators cited here have suggested, the relationship between ethics 
and norms is moving towards an accommodation between universal 
code and autonomous action, and a need to negotiate diverse sexual 
desire in new ethical and theological forms and paradigms. Foucault’s 
emphasis on the ethics of self-control as a way of knowing oneself and 
the limitations of se
  
 
